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A few years ago, Jerry Fodor (1988) complained about the epiphobia which 
seemed to be spreading among philosophers of mind. My aim in this paper is not to 
comment on the relevance of this diagnosis but to investigate another phobia, 
holophobia, the most illustrious victim of which appears to be Fodor himself. 
Holophobia can, be defined as the "neurotic" fear that semantic holism, if not instantly 
extirpated by the most radical means, could well be a deadly threat to intentional 
realism. Fodor's fear has deep roots but the first explicit symptoms of that neurosis 
appear in his book, Psychosemantics (1987), where meaning holism is pilloried, and 
functional role theories of narrow content, considered irremediably contaminated, are 
abandoned in favor of an indexical or "no content" account of narrow content. The 
same worries are at the heart of several of the papers collected in Fodor's A theory of 
Content (1990), and the symptoms culminate in Fodor & Lepore's Holism A Shopper's 
Guide (1992) where a death struggle is engaged with holism.  
My opinion is that Fodor overestimates the threat that meaning holism poses to 
intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content. More precisely, I think 
that he overestimates the difficulties of confining meaning holism within reasonable 
bounds and that his exaggeration of the difficulties of such a task goes together with an 
overestimation of the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration 
that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of reach.  
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Taking a course opposite to Fodor's, I shall argue that all that is needed to defeat 
the more radical varieties of meaning holism is a weaker distinction than the full-blown 
and allegedly inexistent analytic/synthetic distinction. What we need is a distinction 
between what we could call, if the terms were not misleading, the psychoanalytic and 
the psychosynthetic, and what I shall call, less whimsically, the quasi-analytic and the 
quasi-synthetic, - namely, a distinction between what is treated as if it were analytic by 
a cognitive system and what is treated as if it were synthetic.  
I shall further argue that making an appropriate use of this distinction leaves us 
with a moderate and tractable brand of meaning holism which can be considered fairly 
innocuous from the point of view of intentional realism. Last but not least, we are not 
forced anymore to the desperate moves Fodor was advocating: functional role theories 
don't have to be sacrificed on prophylactic grounds and we can preserve a substantial 
notion of narrow content defined in terms of tamed functional roles.  
According to Fodor, arguments in favor of semantic holism are usually nothing 
but elaborations of an "Ur-argument" the general form of which is the following: 
Step 1: Argue that at least some of the epistemic liaisons of a belief determine its 
intentional content. 
Step 2 Run a 'slippery slope' argument to show that there is no principled way of 
deciding which of the epistemic liaisons of a belief determine its intentional 
content. So either none does or they all do. 
Step 3. Conclude that they all do (1, 2: modus tollens) (Fodor, 1987, p. 60) 
Notice that the conclusion, if firmly established, does indeed pose a threat to a 
substantive intentional realism. The threat is not that mental states would be denied 
content; it is rather that a holistic account of the individuation of intentional states sets 
no limit to the diversity of contents. Fodor's main worry can be summarized as follows: 
if we are to individuate people's intentional states by the totality of their epistemic 
liaisons and, if, as is empirically quite probable, no two people are exactly alike in 
terms of the epistemic liaisons of their propositional attitudes, it will turn out that no 
two people will ever be in the same intentional state. Thus, there will be no point in 
trying to contrive intentional generalizations, since these generalizations will not in fact 
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find any application. This would be the end of a substantive intentional psychology the 
aim of which was precisely to enlist intentional generalizations in order to explain 
people 's behavior.  
Now, let us grant that the Ur-argument seems prima facie formally sound. So, if 
the intentional realist wants to avoid the distressing conclusion, he is faced with two 
options. Either he can reject the first premise and deny that any of the epistemic 
liaisons of an attitude are relevant to the determination of its intentional content, or he 
can dispute the second premise: here, the best way to proceed would be to produce 
some criterion allowing us to decide which epistemic liaisons of an attitude might be 
semantically relevant.  
In Psychosemantics (1987), Fodor gives only a short try at the second option 
and, considering it unsuccessful, rapidly settles for a purely denotational semantics. 
Thus, he relegates epistemic liaisons to the limbo of semantically irrelevant facts. 
The advisability of such a rash move appears questionable. As several 
commentators have pointed out, and as Fodor himself in his more lucid moments 
concedes, there is some explanatory work that epistemic liaisons, or more classically 
functional roles, were purported to do and that a denotional semantics alone definitely 
can't achieve. The Oedipus' case is exemplary and is well-know enough to need no 
further rehearsal. In his paper "Substitution Arguments and The Individuation of 
Beliefs" (1989), Fodor has tackled the problem and has tried patching the leaking story 
by giving an account of propositional attitudes as four-place relations. Whatever the 
intrinsic merits of the attempt, one cannot help feeling puzzled at the thought that such 
an account is provided by the hitherto most unrelenting advocate of strong intentional 
realism. Whereas Oedipus' deportment seems to be the perfect case of a behavior that is 
calling for an explanation adverting to intentional generalizations, we are told that the 
explanation should be phrased in terms of differences of vehicles and that, in the matter 
at hand, contents are causally inert!  
Given the problematic outcome of Fodor's chosen move, one wonders whether 
it would not be worth one's while to try harder to force one's way through the other 
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open option. Was not Fodor showing a premature and unusual defeatism when granting 
the second premise of the Ur-argument after scarcely a skirmish or two? Did he have 
compelling reasons for so quickly throwing the towel in? Well, let us simply say he 
thought he had. 
According to Fodor (1987), although confirmation holism does not by itself 
imply holism about meaning, confirmation holism, taken together with the further 
premise that at least some of the epistemic liaisons of an attitude are determinants of its 
intentional content, inescapably leads to the dreadful conclusion. As Fodor construes it, 
Quine's argument in favor of confirmation holism is based on the rejection of semantic 
localism. Semantic localism presupposes that strictly semantic implications can be 
distinguished from merely empirical ones. But Quine has shown the impossibility of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction needed by the semantic localist. Now, the rejection of 
semantic localism together with the acceptance of confirmation holism does not imply 
semantic holism. At least two other options are open: meaning nihilism and purely 
denotational theories of meaning. If, however, you cling to the idea that epistemic 
liaisons must somehow be semantically relevant, meaning holism is your fate. 
Briefly put, if you consider that at least some epistemic liaisons are 
determinants of content, it is useless to try to find a way of deciding which epistemic 
liaisons are semantically relevant because what you would need to effect such a sorting 
out is precisely the analytic/synthetic distinction which Quine has shown was not 
available.  
But, to my mind, such an answer won't do. For even if one agrees that Quine 
has convincingly shown the impossibility of a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction, 
it would seem that what we need here is not a full-blown analytic/synthetic distinction, 
but a distinction between what is treated as if it were analytic by cognitive systems and 
what is treated as if it were synthetic. In other words, insofar as the notion of "epistemic 
liaison" we are interested in is really, as Fodor acknowledges, "a psychological notion, 
not an epistemological one" (1987, p. 56), it seems that what we need in order to 
discriminate among epistemic liaisons also has to be a psychological distinction, and 
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not an epistemological one. Thus, it seems that, for lack of a distinction between the 
analytic and the synthetic per se, a distinction between the quasi-analytic (in the sense 
of treated as analytic by a cognitive system) and the quasi-synthetic would meet our 
needs.  
So here comes a new question: what is preventing Fodor from considering this 
alternative distinction? That the confirmation of scientific theories be inherently 
holistic is one thing, but that the same be true of other types of knowledge or theories is 
quite another matter. It is not obvious, pace Quine (1953, p. 79), that "science is a 
continuation of common sense" and that by way of consequence, scientific 
confirmation inherits its holistic characteristics from common sense. This is however 
an idea to which Fodor readily subscribes, telling us that "if holism seems a plausible 
account of how the scientific community achieves the semantic evaluation of its 
theories, it also looks not bad as a psychology of how individuals achieve the fixation 
of their beliefs" (1987, p. 63). In other words, according to Fodor, belief fixation shares 
its main characteristics with scientific confirmation. Quineanism and isotropy are the 
hallmarks of both enterprises and the attempt to draw a distinction between the quasi-
analytic and the quasi-synthetic is doomed to failure for the same reasons that the 
attempts made in favor of the analytic/synthetic distinction were destined to fail.  
Fodor's dismissal of the possibility of the psychological distinction that I am 
advocating thus depends on the analogy he draws between scientific confirmation and 
belief fixation. But is this analogy a sound one? It seems to me largely misguided. 
Indeed, it presupposes that the rationality involved in scientific dealings is of the same 
type as the rationality involved in the individual's ordinary psychology and behavior. 
Quine's picture of science is that of a project guided by an ideal of absolute rationality. 
The scientific enterprise is a long-term collective enterprise which seeks to free itself 
from the limitations of individual rationality. Whatever the accuracy of such a picture, 
it is not one that easily lends itself to an analogy with belief fixation. The rationality 
manifested in our everyday conduct and actions is in essence a limited rationality. As 
Proust (1991) has pointed out, Fodor misses completely the pragmatic dimension of 
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rationality. One of the main characteristics of the rational behavior of a finite being is 
to develop a strategy of belief-fixation and decision-making which takes into account 
consideration of available cognitive resources, constraints on the task (including time 
constraints) as well as hierarchies of goals. 
Thus it seems that Fodor largely overestimated the relevance of the parallel 
between scientific confirmation and belief fixation. One of the most puzzling 
consequences of embracing this analogy is the claim made by Fodor that the frame-
problem is insolvable. The short way to undermine the analogy is simply to point out 
that, contrary to computers, humans usually do not have the frame-problem. 
Consideration of this fact and of what it might involve concerning human rationality 
makes it all the more surprising that Fodor seems not even to have looked at possible 
relevant data in clinical neuropsychology, in experimental psychology, and in 
anthropology.  
Current psychological research, and especially work on domain-specificity, 
strongly suggests that domain-specificity is not a property true only of peripheral 
systems. This characteristic is shared also by more central cognitive systems. There is 
now growing evidence in favor of the existence of innate constraints on categorization 
and inductive processes. Moreover, the available evidence suggests that to different 
semantic domains correspond different sets of constraints and that those sets determine 
the conceptual organization of the domains to which they apply. I wish to explore the 
idea that the role played by an epistemic liaison in the determination of the intentional 
content of an attitude is a function of the relation this liaison sustains with innate 
constraints on categorization. The closer the association of an epistemic liaison with 
those constraints, the stronger its semantic significance. 
More precisely, its seems that by exploiting the available data on domain-
specificity, we should be able to distinguish among three types of epistemic liaisons: 
first, the quasi-analytic liaisons which are semantically relevant; second, those quasi-
synthetic that also are semantically relevant; and third, the quasi-synthetic liaisons that 
are merely encyclopaedic and have no direct semantic relevance. To take an example, 
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one might have a certain set of beliefs about tigers, for instance, that tigers are animals, 
that they are striped, and that the tiger in the London zoo suffers from rheumatism. 
Intuitively, we would want the first of these beliefs to be classified as quasi-analytic, 
the second as quasi-synthetic but semantically relevant, and the third as simply 
encyclopaedic.  
The distinction between the quasi-analytic and the quasi-synthetic was in a way 
adumbrated by Putnam in his famous paper, "The Meaning of Meaning" (1975). In this 
paper, he acknowledges the special status of certain semantic features and introduces a 
qualitative distinction between what he calls "semantic markers", on the one hand, and 
features which are simply typical and belong to the stereotype, on the other hand. Thus, 
in the case of "tiger", a feature like "animal" is considered a semantic marker, whereas 
a feature like "striped" is simply typical. It happens that the features Putnam classifies 
as semantic markers correspond to the ontological categories towards which we have, 
according to psychologists Frank Keil (1979, 1983, 1986) and Rochel Gelman (1990) 
an innate cognitive bias.  
Faithful to Quine however, Putnam contends that this shoul not be taken to 
mean that the statement "all tigers are animals" is a logical truth but simply that this 
statement is more central, and thus harder to revise than the statement "all tigers are 
striped". However, Putnam's analysis seems to me to be insufficient. What 
distinguishes the two statements is not simply that one is harder to revise than the 
other, it is also that they are not liable to the same type of revision. One way to revise 
the statement "all tigers are striped" is to replace it by "most tigers are striped", but this 
will not do for "all tigers are animal". If we were to discover that some (and only some) 
of the beings we had hitherto called tigers were in fact robots, we would not say that 
our original statement must be revised and replaced by "most tigers are animals". 
Rather, we would say that some of the beings we took for tigers were in fact not tigers. 
It is only if we were to discover that all tigers were robots that we would revise our 
statement. The way to revise it would then be to say that "no tiger is an animal". Thus, 
we have a criterion for quasi-analyticity: a statement of the form "all As are Bs" is 
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quasi-analytic if and only if the only way to revise it is to replace it by "no A is a B". 
We can see that this criterion is psychological and not epistemological since quasi-
analyticity is strongly tied to our innate cognitive biases  
Given that we have a criterion for quasi-analyticity, our last problem is to 
distinguish among the remaining epistemic liaisons (the quasi-synthetic ones) those 
that are semantically relevant and those that are merely encyclopaedic and of no direct 
semantic relevance. Once again, we should lend an ear to the suggestions of 
psychologists. Of special interest for the present problem is the proposal put forth by 
Gelman: 
I propose that implicit domain-specific principles specify the core of 
many of the concepts and categories with which young children learn to sort the 
world. Domain-specific principles function to direct attention to the objects, 
events, or attributes that are relevant exemplars. The exemplars in turn feed 
general processing abilities, including the ability to extract from stored 
information the predictive validity of the characteristics of the items assimilated 
to a domain" (Gelman, 1990, p. 90) 
The feature of this proposal most interesting to us is that the task devoted to 
general processing mechanisms is not to extract the defining characteristics of items 
belonging to a category but simply to extract characteristics having a high cue-validity. 
In Gelman's model, a clear difference is made between what defines a category - its 
conceptual core - and what commonly determines which objects are assigned to which 
categories. Thus, this model acknowledges the distinction between those determinants 
of content that are quasi-analytic and those that are not. Also, the model accounts for 
the difference between the epistemic liaisons which are determinants of content and 
those which are not. Thus, the belief that tigers are striped is semantically relevant 
because even if being striped is not a necessary condition for belonging to the category 
of tigers, it is, however, a high-validity cue. On the contrary, my belief that the tiger of 
the London zoo is rheumatic does not have to be treated as a determinant of content 
because neither being rheumatic nor being a resident of the London zoo are reliable 
indicators of tigerness.  
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As a final point, it should be noted that what we have here is not a sharp 
distinction between semantically relevant and semantically irrelevant epistemic 
liaisons, but a graded notion of semantic relevance. Is this a weakness of the position I 
have been proposing? I think not. It would be a weakness, if we didn't have a solid 
grasp on the conceptual core of categories, but the criterion of quasi-analiticity gives us 
this grasp. It seems, on the contrary, that this criterion of quasi-analyticity, together 
with a graded notion of semantic relevance for non-quasi-analytic epistemic liaisons, 
leads to a view of intentional content which makes it possible to conjoin stability and 
flexibility of content. If the crucial question for functional role semantics is the 
question of what counts as identity and difference of functional role, and if, as Ned 
Block (1986) is contending, we have, in order to answer this question, "to move to a 
scientific conception of meaning that does away with the crude dichotomy of 
same/different meaning in favor of a multidimensional gradient of similarity of 
meaning" (Block, 1986, p. 629), then the proposal put forth in this paper should be 
considered as an attempt to move in this direction.  
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